Introduction

Louise Braddock and Michael Lacewing

In Part I of this Introduction, Louise Braddock assesses how the individual papers in this book contribute to interdisciplinarity. Part II, by Michael Lacewing, situates the overall contribution in the broader context of humanistic enquiry.

Part I

The St John's College Research Centre workshop and seminar series which took place in 2005 reflected a curiosity about whether psychoanalysis could be defended as an academic discipline. We were interested to see whether philosophy could help retrieve psychoanalysis as a coherent subject of study, an 'intellectual edifice', from the dispersed state in which it exists inside and outside of the academic world. An initial difficulty here is that the form of thinking characteristic of clinical psychoanalysis is seen as antithetic to the form of thinking that prevails in the academic world. The associative form of thought displayed in dreams and fantasies, developed to a high degree in psychoanalytic free association and interpretation, also finds its way into some theoretical psychoanalytic writing, where it stands in contrast to the logical rationality canonical for most academic disciplines. This presents a difficulty when the two forms of thought are compared, one being held to trump or displace the other, and psychoanalysis' institutionally sanctioned alignment with the first, associative, form of thinking has contributed to keeping it apart from the mainstream academic establishment in Britain. However, the psychoanalysts who have contributed to this book may be said all to fall into the group of those who are mindful of the need to understand the relation between these forms of thought and who see philosophical interest in psychoanalysis as a resource for doing this.

Philosophy over the last century in Britain has been predominantly critical. Increasingly, however, concerns have been voiced by philosophers within this tradition of analytic philosophy, that the emphasis on technical and formalistic problems generated from inside the discipline increasingly disable philosophy from pursuing what many philosophers see as its primary

and original task of trying to understand ourselves and our world. This project, for which a wide-ranging argument is given by John Cottingham in his contribution to this book (Chapter 5), has been posed as the philosophical task of humanistic enquiry. In this enterprise, psychoanalysis has a contribution to make through re-introducing into philosophy an account of human nature and the human condition that corrects for the 'bleaching out' of aspects of the human picture in over-technical analytic philosophy, and helping to restore what has aptly been called 'a sense of the original problem' (the phrase, and the sentiment, are in Gaukroger 1997: 2). But the remit of this project is wider than what philosophy alone, even alerted to a sense of its limited resources, can supply; it must turn also to the sciences, both the social and the natural life sciences, and to the humanities outside of philosophy, if it is to build up a picture of ourselves as natural creatures living under culture. Psychoanalysis having affinities with all of these disciplines then provides a way to put philosophy in touch with them. This duality of appraisal, setting what philosophy makes of psychoanalysis alongside what philosophy takes from psychoanalysis, has characterized recent philosophical engagement with psychoanalysis. The four philosophical papers in this volume use constructive analytic elucidation to take, broadly, one of these two approaches; those by John Cottingham (Chapter 5) and myself (Chapter 8) discuss in philosophical terms the intellectual coherence of psychoanalysis with broader projects in the humanities or in science respectively, and Edward Harcourt (Chapter 7) and Michael Lacewing (Chapter 6) evaluate psychoanalytic concepts for their usefulness and applicability to philosophical projects.

The four papers by practising psychoanalysts all deal with psychoanalysis as a psychology concerned with the vicissitudes of the human psyche under unconscious determination, both in the consulting room, as vividly described by Richard Rusbridger (Chapter 3) and outside it in the ordinary conditions of life: Susan Budd (Chapter 2) discusses psychoanalysis and reading, David Tuckett (Chapter 4) examines its relevance to trading, and Michael Brearley (Chapter 1) draws out connections between clinical work and psychological interactions in playing cricket. As the emphasis of this volume is on interdisciplinarity and since familiarity of academic audiences with psychoanalytic clinical practice and theory varies, these four papers are intended to represent the complexities of both in an accessible way, rather than present these for academic scrutiny. The focus of these papers is on presenting psychoanalysis as a psychology in use, as it is done and thought about now, to provide a baseline understanding and also to protect against the antiquarianism that attends academic treatments equating psychoanalysis with the work of Freud.

The four papers by writers in the humanities and social sciences are at first sight more heterogeneous, eluding a concise précis of what unites them; all, however, are analytic. On the one hand there is the sociological analysis

of psychoanalytic practice and its place in contemporary theory-formation provided by Michael Rustin (Chapter 9), also offering support to the continuing relevance of psychoanalysis. On the other hand are papers by writers in the humanities whose focus is on Freud himself, though in each case within a critical apparatus of cultural-historical or literary analysis: Ritchie Robertson (Chapter 10) on Freud's employment of his imagination, Clare Connors (Chapter 11) on Freud's conception of force as revealed through textual analysis, and John Fletcher (Chapter 12) summarizing, for use by feminist theory, the theory of primal seduction advanced as a theoretically driven revision of Freud by the French psychoanalyst Jean Laplanche.

The papers here present psychoanalysis in a range of guises: an equal partner with religion and philosophy in humanistic enquiry, a social science, a form of Romantic intellectual exploration, a resource for critical disciplines such as feminism, a psychology of clinical practice and of everyday life, and a deepened range of investigation for moral philosophy. What might unite these different disciplinary perspectives? Can they be shown to present different aspects of a coherent intellectual unity, psychoanalysis' academic face as scrutinised under different lights?

Interdisciplinarity

This book represents a commitment to interdisciplinarity as an academic virtue, implying tolerance and respect for other intellectual points of view, curiosity and openness to what can be learned from them, and a degree of humility or at least realism with respect to the limitations of one's own discipline. Interdisciplinarity implies also a certain realism with respect to the evolution and shift in disciplinary identities and affinities as new intellectual alliances form. One such alliance, in which psychoanalysis figures, is that between disciplines concerning themselves with culture, forming new links across the old divisions between the humanities, social sciences, and arts. However, such shifts do not simply create new fields of study, they also put pressure on the old ones as different vocabularies, methodologies, and categories of appraisal are brought to bear, so that in the extreme the object of study can seem to fracture. This, at times, has seemed the fate of psychoanalysis, scattered in many academic departments while belonging unequivocally to no one academic discipline. One might conclude then that psychoanalysis is protean only through being plural, that its presence in many different areas represents a separation into different entities, and that its success far from psychology in humanities departments is due to a transdisciplinary reinvention away from its origins in nineteenth-century science and away also from a clinical practice that now only contingently bears the same name. This is unpromising for the ambition of delineating an academic face for psychoanalysis across the disciplines. For in the humanities,

psychoanalysis appears transformed into a theory about language and symbolism where there is no purchase for any sort of naturalism. Here, poetics has displaced psychology, the psyche as a natural object of investigation has been filleted out, and the minded human being as a subject of study has disappeared from fields of enquiry outside science. Thus is the split between the sciences and the humanities perpetuated.

One might, however, wish to resist arriving at this sort of pluralist view, believing (as we do) that more is to be gained intellectually by holding together for investigation the disparate elements of a complex and protean body of theory of the mind and its working. One way to do this might be to investigate how psychoanalytic psychology, through a sort of multidisciplinary serviceableness, could be supplying a resource to a variety of client disciplines, rather as mathematics does in physics or biology. Indeed, psychoanalysis can be seen as such a resource in the social sciences. Through its theorization of unconscious motivation it is well suited to critical approaches, in social theory and feminism, aimed at bringing out the way that cultural systems conceal and construct meanings and the ways compromise is brokered by institutions. Also, as a psychology of the mechanics of interaction at the level of the individual, it provides a psychology of humans in their social and cultural being which does indeed have applicability to social science disciplines pursuing with their different methodologies the common venture of understanding human beings and their ways of life. David Tuckett's paper (Chapter 4) is in part a contribution of this sort. Tuckett shows how, when Freud's own theories are augmented by Kleinian and post-Kleinian theory, in particular by the work of Wilfrid Bion on the deep forms of irrationality that are brought to the fore in times of social instability, collectively irrational behaviour in financial markets, such as the dot.com bubble, can be understood psychoanalytically.

However, even if it is conceded that psychoanalysis is centrally a psychology, both as conceived by Freud and as employed in clinical practice, it occupies a peripheral position in academic psychology (the psychoanalytically informed empirical work in developmental psychology carried out in some British psychology departments is unfortunately not represented here). For this the early critiques and indeed polemics against psychoanalysis' title to be considered a science are partly responsible, in having encouraged the alternative view of psychoanalysis as a purely hermeneutic discipline: since psychoanalysis is concerned with matters to do with interpretation, meaning, and language, it should be severed from psychology and classified with the humanities. This relegation of psychoanalysis needs, however, to be set alongside an appreciation of the extent to which the dispute over its status as a psychology is part of the wider, and still unresolved, general debate over forms of explanation in the social sciences. Philosophers have long pointed out that psychology as a discipline is not immune to conceptual problems to do with forms of explanation. Within

the social sciences the instability in how we are to conceptualize psychology as a way of understanding ourselves, while appearing settled as divergences of methodology between qualititative and quantitative approaches, springs from a conceptual difficulty over how to define ourselves as objects of study. This is the difficulty which the philosophical project of humanistic understanding seeks to address, and one way to approach the question of what might be the unitary subject matter of psychoanalysis is to ask what philosophy might make of psychoanalysis as it is presented in the papers in this volume. Within and between the papers collected here there are thematic linkages around topics with which philosophy has always concerned itself: knowledge and understanding, imagination and truth, meaning and reality, language and experience. These are concepts which psychoanalysis has explicated, in its own terms, psychologically, and one task for philosophy is to elucidate their use by psychoanalysis.

Psychoanalysis: the view from philosophy

The story of what philosophy makes of psychoanalysis may perhaps have begun with but is not concluded by the well-known critique of psychoanalysis' title to scientificity. This venerable controversy is not itself revived here, having been broadened into more general arguments noted by both myself and Rustin in our papers in this volume (Chapters 8 and 9 respectively), for interpretive forms of explanation as the 'hermeneutic turn' in the social sciences. Nevertheless, the underlying question about psychoanalysis' claim to provide knowledge remains central: that this is knowledge, gained in recognizably systematic and reliable ways, is argued by Rustin for the general case. Rustin's defence of psychoanalytic methodology as falling within the canon of the social sciences provides a corrective to misapprehensions arising from ignorance about the processes of psychoanalytic knowledge-gathering. Rustin also emphasizes the empirical groundedness of psychoanalytic theory formation: it is clinical psychoanalytic observation and the pressure put on existing theory by recalcitrant data that provoke new theory formation, exemplified, Rustin suggests, by Freud's discovery of phantasy at the origin of hysterical symptoms, or the formulation and use of the counter-transference.

A fine-grained view of psychoanalytic observation is provided in the detail of the clinical interactions given in Richard Rusbridger's paper (Chapter 3). But as Rustin emphasizes and as Rusbridger's work shows, observation in the clinical setting depends on knowledge, including the analyst's self-knowledge which permits reflective self-interpretive thought. This theme of the observing analyst's self-knowledge, its painful and painstaking nature, and its theoretical groundedness, runs through the clinicians' papers. As self-knowledge it is not lightly acquired, and neither is it purely theoretical knowledge. Susan Budd (Chapter 2) contrasts the reading of technical

psychoanalytic writing by the lay person, whether interested, curious, or critical, with how it is read by the analyst or therapist approaching it from the stance of the practitioner. Here, training and supervision, experience of the analytic process both as analyst and as analysand, experience reflected on and theoretically assimilated, and the gradual acquisition of clinical 'craft skills' (Rustin's phrase) all come together to form the practitioner, for whom reading theory is a professional activity to elucidate and help organize experience. The papers by Rusbridger and Michael Brearley (Chapters 3 and 1 respectively) show how in psychoanalytic practice the analyst must exercise these skills and abilities, the ability for instance to recognize and tolerate painful emotions of powerlessness and frustration, so as to continue to occupy, *vis-à-vis* both the patient and the analyst's own experiencing self, a position in which the capacity to think can be retained.

The role of theory as supporting but not dictating understanding lies behind Rusbridger's claim of a continued theoretical role for the Oedipus complex. For Kleinian theorists it names a psychic structure which represents for the subject the fact of his inescapable inter-relatedness with others who are also independent subjects with their own minds and their own relationships. Acceptance of this provides the ground of a 'truthful relation to reality'. As all the clinical discussions by psychoanalysts bring out, truthfulness is central: there are truths, facts of emotional life, which the patient must discover for himself in the analytic process, supported by the activity of the analyst in interpreting both the patient's communicative behaviour and his own experience. These psychoanalytic facts, of the independence of the analyst from the patient and the creativity of the analyst's relation to his own mind, are discovered by the patient experiencing them in the relation with the analyst, and the Oedipus complex simply denotes the structure in the mind which enables this reality-orientation. As the clinical papers also emphasize, it is the emotional aspect of the subject's experience of these relations that is crucial in the discovery of these truths, whose reality is obscured by psychological defence against the painfulness of their acceptance. It is thus with process, with the minutiae of the clinical interaction and the subject's emotional responses that the analytic work is concerned, and the sort of self-knowledge had through psychoanalysis is to be seen as a form of truthfulness or self-understanding, a state in which 'the patient is introduced to himself' in Brearley's words, or in Budd's: 'Analysts differ as to how important or possible it is to reach the truth; most think the important thing is to empower the patient to think about it for themselves'.

Much, then, of the knowledge yielded by psychoanalysis is particularistic, self-knowledge acquired by individuals, guided by general psychoanalytical theory. But does this general theory itself amount to knowledge? On Rustin's account its methodology, while having distinctive features to do with its particularism, is nevertheless recognizable as falling within the practices of the social sciences, while I argue that psychoanalytic

psychology's functionalist theory of the defence mechanisms is empirically based in observed changes in affect, suggesting too that the connection to the behavioural life sciences should not be dismissed. Such arguments contribute to rebutting the view that Freud perpetrates an intellectual error in confusing the scientific and the hermeneutic, a polemic which has, as already observed, to some extent lost its ground as the debate over forms of knowledge in the social sciences has evolved.

Part of that polemic was, however, fuelled by a different consideration, the claim by critics that Freud was motivated in this error by his ambition to be seen as a great scientist. While Freud's motivation does not bear directly on the truth or falsity of his theories or their intellectual merits, a deeper question about the nature and the object of psychoanalytic theorizing is opened up by Ritchie Robertson's subtler reading of Freud's motivation and his achievement (Chapter 10). Robertson suggests it is from the imaginative exploration of the human condition in Romantic literature that Freud draws, for re-casting in a scientistic idiom, the enduring human truths he purports to explain scientifically. Accordingly, Freud's identification with the scientific giants of the nineteenth century is not to be seen as motivated by bad faith but as of a piece with his imaginative mode of proceeding. By drawing attention to Freud's attunement with the literary ambience and background of his milieu, Robertson allows us to see how it might be Freud's imagination, rather than a desire for power or recognition, that both drove his theorizing and determined, as its subject matter, the inner psychological human world. For the Romantics, both individual self-knowledge and knowledge of the human condition in general were to be had through the imagination and Robertson argues that Freud both draws on and also works within this tradition. As it has been observed, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (Freud 1900), while outwardly presented as a scientific treatise, is in fact a journey of autobiographical self-exploration and self-healing on Freud's part. Here as elsewhere Freud's own mode of discovery is imaginative exploration and Robertson suggests that Freud's self-presentation as a scientist is part of his imaginative project. Freud would not, of course, be alone in adopting a method of presentation which did not reflect his method of discovery but Robertson suggests, in effect, that with Freud the former is a motivated misrepresentation, permitting without endorsing Freud's imaginative exploration of the contemporary literary preoccupation with the role of the imagination in human self-understanding.

Imagination has its place in science too, however; science relies on the imagination to generate conjectures. In my own paper (Chapter 8) I set out how Freud's scientifically motivated conjecturing about the mind in the 'Project for a scientific psychology' (Freud 1950) results in the discovery of the ways in which mental regulation can be observed to occur in the analytic session. In combining the systematicity of scientific theorizing with

imaginative insight into the meaning of (apparently irrational) symptomatic behaviours, Freud can be seen as anticipating attempts to combine the interpretive and the functionalist elements in the social sciences. Nevertheless he seems to have kept apart both from the social sciences themselves and from the hermeneutic turn taken in German social science. For this his clinician's focus on the individual case, together with his Romanticism directing him towards his own thought-world, are responsible, together with what might, in this case accurately, be called his 'genius'. For Freud seems to have been signally able to take his own mental processes as an object of study without losing his grip on how to theorize what he saw himself doing when he thought. Not only did his theoretical understanding depend to a significant extent on his being able to observe himself doing what he then theorized, but it also relied on a less objectified, more intuitive, and so more Romantic, form of self-knowledge. It might be that Freud was brought to understand much better the processes of wishful thinking and wilful self-deception through perpetrating these himself, coming to understand at first hand from self-observation how an apparently reasonable and culturally intelligible set of beliefs, desires, and attitudes could at the same time have a meaning which chimed with unconscious wishes, for instance the wish to be a 'conquistador'. We may ourselves conjecture that in imagining or fantasying himself as a scientist-hero, where a motivated 'blindness' was the precondition for his insight into the imaginative working of the mind, and in his autobiographical voyage of self-discovery in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (Freud 1900), Freud formed his theory as his theoretical insight emerged in the completion of interpretive self-understanding.

Psychoanalysis as a resource for philosophy

Another way to defend the nature of theoretical psychoanalytic knowledge is to compare it with the kind of knowledge that the philosophically delineated project of humanistic enquiry aims for. Psychoanalysis with its duality of theory and practice is the resource the philosophical project needs here. Indeed it is one that, John Cottingham argues (Chapter 5), it cannot do without: psychoanalytic thought and practice go along with both philosophical and religious investigation into the human condition. To the extent that our knowledge of ourselves, both as individuals and as the sort of creature we are, is gained through reflectiveness there seems to be a place ready-made for psychoanalytic theory within that enquiry, shaped as it is by a view of ourselves as 'self-interpreting animals', as constituted by our perpetual attempt to understand ourselves and our world, through the fundamental human activity of interpretation (Taylor 1985). But philosophy on its own is unable to expand the concept of self-interpretation so as to do justice to experience; agony and ecstasy are, one feels, too

experientially embedded to be entirely tractable to philosophy. Interpretation explicated philosophically as linguistic articulation, even keeping in mind Wittgenstein's (1968) insistence that linguistic activity is, ultimately, observable rule-governed behaviour, provides no firm connection with the facts of human embodiedness. Nor is there a clear place in this scheme of things for the appetites, for the physicality of emotion and sexuality, or for the acuteness of pleasure and pain in psychic life, yet these experiences also require understanding and interpretation, and their motivational efficacy has eluded philosophical explanation. For many of these philosophical puzzles, psychoanalytic theory does not, in its current state, provide more than a sketch of how answers might be formulated. But several of the papers in this volume can be seen to bring psychoanalytic theory into relation with philosophy, to improve and inform the philosophical understanding of emotion, motivation, and feeling.

Edward Harcourt (Chapter 7) proposes a revised account of the emotions of shame and guilt, emotions with which psychoanalysis is particularly concerned and in which philosophy has become interested. Harcourt argues that guilt must, if it is to be motivational, be linked not with fear of an authority figure, as Freud's theory of the superego has it, but with love. The pain of guilt, Harcourt suggests, is that of separation from a loved internal figure. Importantly, since psychoanalytic theory itself can only benefit from clear argumentative support, Harcourt's arguments converge on a shared position with the clinically driven Kleinian theorization of the superego in maturity as actuated by remorse and the desire to repair (Klein 1975). Accessing such emotions in psychoanalytic interpretation, as we have seen, involves articulation of what is unconsciously felt, or if consciously experienced then only as distorted by the defensive activity of the mind. But unconscious feeling is held to be philosophically perplexing; feeling has usually been understood as accessible to consciousness either actually or retrospectively. Michael Lacewing (Chapter 6) explores a theorization of unconscious feeling which can accommodate psychoanalysis' extension of the purview of interpretation. Lacewing notes that psychoanalysis' theory of defence requires that unconscious feeling must be what elicits the operation of the psychic defences; if we accept the defences we must accept also that they are driven by unconscious feeling. But our understanding of mental states as having causal efficacy through their subjective experiential quality or 'phenomenology' does not require that causal efficacy or its phenomenological ground be present to conscious awareness, actually or retrospectively.

Lacewing's conception of emotion belongs with recent psychoanalytically informed work taking emotions to be dispositions or attitudes providing an evaluative orientation to the world. It was emphasized earlier that in psychoanalytic practice the orientation, the re-orientation, to reality is achieved when an emotion is truthfully identified, and that this truthfulness

is itself bound up in experience. Naming the emotion is not enough; self-understanding can only occur if the emotion is itself in the end consciously experienced, and 'tolerated'. It is a condition of acquiring this sort of experiential knowledge that the analyst can both experience what needs to be experienced with or on behalf of his patient, or in himself, and can at the same time retain the analytic attitude of free-floating attention in order not to foreclose on understanding. This requirement on practice, not too speedily to impose language and form on the fluidities of the imagination, not only reflects a psychological necessity but suggests a condition on interpretation as it is philosophically conceived; for it reminds us of something already touched on in this Introduction, the role of the imagination in thought and the way in which when imagination and experience come together in reflection, old situations and problems can be seen in new ways, a re-orientation occurs, and new understandings can be articulated and given linguistic expression.

Articulating experience and the linguistic limitations of this is the theme in John Fletcher's account of Laplanche's re-reading of Freud's seduction theory (Chapter 12). Laplanche's own theory, of 'primal seduction', is driven by textual and conceptual consideration of the 'problematic' of Freudian theory; it results in a theorization of the unconscious as consisting in those parts of early infantile experience in the 'fundamental anthropological situation' of nurture that are unavailable to thought, yet are still felt to be the bearers of meaning. Regarding 'seduction' as a normal part of human nurture, Laplanche sees the infant as involved in a mutual, natural (and non-abusive) sexual excitation in the course of ordinary parental handling; to the extent that the sexual import of this is opaque to the adult it cannot be presented to the infant in a way that can be assimilated and eventually understood, but must remain un-understood for both and so, in Laplanche's phrase, 'enigmatic'. In its uncomprehended or, in Lacanian terminology, its 'de-signified' state, the record of such experience remains inaccessible and so, unconscious. The contents of the unconscious in Laplanche's theory are then the residues or 'de-signified signifiers' of enigmatic messages which must wait for articulation until the cognitive-linguistic and emotional conditions for understanding become available, in the course of development or in psychoanalysis. Such retrospective articulation of experience is linked by Laplanche with what Freud in a more restricted context called 'Nachträglichkeit' (Fletcher translates Laplanche's own term for this, 'après-coup', as 'afterwardsness'). However, we may also see 'Nachträglichkeit' as assimilated to the reflectiveness on the past which forms part of the human activity of self-interpretation; a literary depiction of the way that we constantly revise and reinterpret experiences lodged in memory is to be found, as Budd points out, in Proust's writing.

Fletcher suggests that Laplanche is a resource for feminist theory in providing an alternative to Freudian and Lacanian phallocentrism about

gender. On Laplanche's account, gender is constructed through primal seduction, in the interaction between infant and parent during nurture. The Laplanchean conception of the unconscious as the repository of ununderstood experiences is itself a gender-neutral account. It is also distanced by Laplanche from Lacan's theorization of the unconscious as linguistic and so under the law of the father. Although the extent to which Laplanche's thought is truly independent of Lacanian theory is open to question, the point cannot be pursued further here, since Lacan is not directly dealt with in this volume. This is a lacuna in our interdisciplinary investigation of psychoanalysis; understanding of the work of Lacan is important if only so as to understand better the indifference and hostility (notable in the absence of much other common ground) shared by the mainstreams of both British psychoanalysis and analytic philosophy. However, other French thought in psychoanalysis is represented in this volume by Clare Connors (Chapter 11) who invokes Derrida's deconstructive critique of Freud's concept of force in 'The project for a scientific psychology' (Freud 1950). Connors goes on to offer a deconstructive reading of Freud's (1920) *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, canvassing a solution to a problem not directly addressed by Freud but implicit in his metapsychology, that of how the causal physical world of forces comes to be represented in the mind. Representing or, in literary terminology, figuring the forcefulness of repeated impact so as to buffer the mind against the irruption of force, is the mode of mental operation under the pleasure principle, Derrida (1978) suggests. Connors calls on Derrida's concept of iterability to support her claim that it is through an 'energetic hermeneutics' that the concept of force comes into play in Freud's writing. Translating the 'Wiederholungszwang' (translated in the Standard Edition of Freud's works as 'repetition-compulsion') as 'repetition-force', Connors sees here force making itself felt in language.

Connors' proposal is an intricate response to Ricoeur's (1970) well-known critique of Freud from a quite different starting point to the defence of psychoanalysis as an interpretive human science which we have already encountered. The very different methodology she employs nevertheless shows the affinities with the methods of analytic philosophy of close reading and deconstruction in the detailed analysis of the use of language in Freud's texts, and more generally it may be said that literary theory as a theory of how language works is a subject of evident interest to analytic philosophy as well as having methodological affinities with it. But here it is literary theory's conception of the text as having its own dynamics that represents its distinctively psychoanalytic contribution to the philosophical understanding of human self-interpretation. Psychoanalytic literary theory frames important qualifications on the extent to which interpretation can bring experience under linguistic articulation, some of its proponents asserting, notoriously, an inherently radical instability of meaning. More

modestly it supplies a theoretical analysis of how language, as text, works to convey and conceal meaning and, as Connors suggests, to create it too. Here, Connors' result is of interest for both philosophy and psychoanalytic theory, in suggesting an approach to theorizing the forcefulness of states with 'phenomenology', that property of mental states that accounts for their causal efficacy discussed in Lacewing's paper (Chapter 6).

Conclusions

How do matters now stand with the claim that psychoanalysis is a unitary (if multifaceted) discipline? It is for the reader to form a view here, but we have seen some of the aspects under which psychoanalysis presents itself to academic enquiry, and the following synthesis can be suggested for what might hold the whole together.

Historically and conceptually psychoanalysis provides a psychology of human relating throughout life: it deals with, among other things, emotion, sexuality, imagination, action, and motivation, as well as with development, character, mental illness, and humankind's relation to and embeddedness in its culture. For although presenting as an individual psychology on account of the clinical and theoretical focus on the patient, psychoanalysis is at least as much a psychology of humans as social and cultural beings. It looks both inward to the emotions and self-knowledge of the individual, and outward to the realities of interpersonal relating and their impact on the individual. Philosophical investigation brings to the fore questions of knowledge, truth, language, and meaning. This is not an exercise in philosophical cataloguing but an indicator of the position currently achieved in psychoanalysis' own evolution as a discipline of humanistic enquiry. But there are many other themes – the part played in mental life by imagination, by emotion, and by self-knowledge.

The question of knowledge remains central: first, as seen in the clinical papers in this volume, there is the particular knowledge which is part of an individual's self-understanding and is arrived at through experience, supported by theory. But there is also theoretical knowledge: psychoanalysis contributes to our knowledge of the sort of creature we are. This theory, or body of theories, is rooted in knowledge of the first kind, that had in individual experience of relating to others, of communicative activity and of emotionality. Theoretical psychoanalytic knowledge is continually subject to critical evaluation and re-appraisal in philosophy and the humanities, to experimental investigation in psychology (not represented here), and to modification and change in the institutional setting of professional clinical psychoanalysis where individual experience, on an established British model of practice, is fundamental in grounding and correcting theory.

Individual self-exploration in psychoanalysis aims at grasping certain facts about oneself and about the separateness of persons – their autonomy

as subjects and agents. Truth, as knowledge of the facts, depends on truthfulness, where truthfulness is more than being a reliable witness or reporter of facts, more than a trustworthy source of evidence. For, as the philosopher Bernard Williams (1995: 233) observes of ethical thinking, 'One of the things in valuing truth we have to protect ourselves against is wishful thinking, which along with self-deception is a particularly insidious enemy of truthfulness.' Psychoanalysis has a theory of this inimicality, which it refers to unconscious states and processes which distort perception, action, and thought so as to avoid mental pain. Truthfulness matters acutely in psychoanalysis if real mitigation of pain is to be achieved, with enough tolerance of it for the defensive processes to become evident and available to be understood. Only then can articulation into language of what is being defended against, and the meaning of what is unconsciously felt, be accessed.

What an experience, a piece of imagining, or an action, may mean for the subject is established through interpretation as part of self-interpretation as a constitutive human activity. Imputations of the subjectivity of psychoanalytic interpretation as motivated misreadings by the analyst or as collusive attempts with the patient to establish some gratifying or plausible narrative, ignore the key role of truthfulness in constraining interpretation emphasized here. Meaning and interpretation go together and language is the medium or vehicle of both: language is integral to interpretation, since it is through language that meanings are articulated and the rules of communicative activity are made available. But not all thought can be articulated into language and bodily experience may outrun and at times overwhelm linguistic capture, in ways for which French theoretical work in psychoanalysis can provide useful formulations.

Here then is one thread through the many complex viewpoints on psychoanalysis which the papers in this volume open up for thought and investigation. The reader will doubtless find perspectives opening onto other disciplines not represented here. It is hoped that new paths and the ones traced out here will be found to do more than cross; that they will be found to connect and in doing so provoke new understandings.

Louise Braddock

Part II

In her remarks, Louise Braddock has drawn attention to a variety of ways in which philosophy may approach psychoanalysis. Her initial contrast is between what philosophy makes of psychoanalysis and what philosophy may take from psychoanalysis. As she notes, into the first fall the debates which have dominated philosophy's traditional taking up of the 'question' of psychoanalysis, debates over the epistemology and methodology of

psychoanalysis, its scientific status and the relation of this to hermeneutics, its standing as a subject of knowledge at all. It is a topic of philosophical interest that continues unabated (see Mills 2004), an issue that falls squarely within standard philosophy of psychology, with its concerns about methodology, the nature of psychological explanation, and coherent models of the mind. It is also the interaction between philosophy and psychoanalysis that is best known, perhaps not least because many philosophers have felt that it determines an answer to the second question, of what philosophy may take from psychoanalysis, viz. nothing. If psychoanalysis is not in good standing as a body of knowledge, then philosophy has little to learn from it. There have been many responses to this position in the last 25 years (see e.g. Glymour 1982; Hopkins 1982, 1988; Edelson 1984; Lear 1990; Sachs 1991; Gardner 1993: Chs 4, 8; Wollheim 1993: Ch. 6; Levy 1996; Cottingham 1998: Ch. 4), and two further discussions of the status and nature of psychoanalytic knowledge claims are included in this volume (Braddock, Chapter 8 and Rustin, Chapter 9).

Taking it as established that psychoanalysis has something positive to offer philosophy, Braddock notes that psychoanalysis may be taken up by philosophy as an account of human nature; as a resource for critical, e.g. feminist, and moral philosophy; as a theoretical, and – when psychoanalytic interpretation is used in a particular case – a practical, contribution to the task of self-interpretation; as a set of reflections on concerns that overlap with philosophy, including knowledge, understanding, imagination, truth, meaning, reality, language, and experience; in sum, as a closely complementary part of 'the humanistic enquiry'.

Human experience

Many fields within philosophy begin with reflection on some aspect of human experience. Michael Brearley (Chapter 1) points to ways in which psychoanalysis can be considered continuous with everyday experiences of understanding, insight, and the difficulty of self-understanding. We may say, then, that psychoanalysis offers up, if not an entirely new, then an under-examined, set of experiences. The clinical data of the psychoanalytic 'encounter' or relationship are significant not only in psychoanalytic theorization, but as human experiences that call for understanding and explanation in a broader context. They need to be integrated into our conception of what it is to be human, and in particular, into our account of the dynamics of the human mind.

The first way in which philosophy can take something from psychoanalysis is to pay attention to and draw upon the data that psychoanalysis provides in the construction of theories. This is an approach I adopt in my investigation of unconscious emotion (Chapter 6). What drives the critical engagement with the philosophical theories examined is their ability to

account for the 'data', taking as an exemplary of the explanatory demand created by clinical data, episodes in Freud's case study of the 'Rat Man' (Freud 1909). In developing a theoretical account of emotion in general, many philosophical texts draw upon experience of emotion that forms part of our 'everyday' and 'commonsense' understanding. Part of my argument is that by not attending additionally to those aspects of human experiences shown up by psychoanalysis, no less 'everyday', but certainly less 'commonsense', philosophical theories – in this case of an aspect of the mind – may be inadequate in some way.

In its 'thinnest' form, this first approach does not yet attempt to assimilate and build upon psychoanalytic theory, either its theoretical concepts or theorized mental structures. However, it is difficult to go far in the use of clinical data without also understanding and using the psychoanalytic concepts that were developed from the data, and in particular those theorized processes of defence which, in her piece, Louise Braddock (Chapter 8) argues are most closely based upon clinical observation. As a second way in which philosophy may take something from psychoanalysis, we find here two further resources: a set of concepts regarding the structure and dynamics of the mind and a theory of unconscious motivation. Edward Harcourt (Chapter 7) draws upon both in his analysis of the nature of guilt and shame. John Cottingham (1998: Ch. 4) does the same regarding arguments over the nature and possibility of rational self-direction, and the place of that ideal in moral philosophy, while in his piece here, he presents a more general argument for the complementarity of the moral, religious, and psychoanalytic quests for human fulfilment. Richard Wollheim (1984) and Sebastian Gardner (1993) argue for broader conclusions in philosophy of mind regarding the nature of mental functioning, with implications for questions about the nature of phenomenology, the causal powers of mental states, representation, and the place and scope of belief-desire psychology.

While these examples in ethics and philosophy of mind spring to mind, and the implications of psychoanalysis for explanation and methodology have been the subject of the traditional philosophical debate in the philosophy of science, the contribution of clinically based psychoanalytic concepts and theory to philosophy is not limited to these three fields of philosophical enquiry. Topics within other areas of philosophical enquiry may equally draw upon psychoanalytic ideas, and while the application of these ideas requires caution, issues in aesthetics (e.g. expressivism, reading fiction), political philosophy (the role of emotion, the projection of the superego in group thinking), philosophy of social science and of history (the nature of human motivation and the explanation of action), philosophy of language (meaning, metaphor), philosophy of religion (the role and function of belief in God, the nature of spiritual maturity), and epistemology (epistemic virtues, self-knowledge, the relation of truth and truthfulness) may all be illuminated in this way. It is at this level of intercourse, then,

that many of the overlapping concerns Louise Braddock mentioned earlier individually find a home.

Humanistic enquiry

From what has been said so far, it is clear that enumerating how philosophy may take up psychoanalysis depends just as much on one's conception of philosophy, as it does on one's understanding of the epistemic status of psychoanalysis. In a recent lecture to the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Bernard Williams characterizes philosophy as a 'humanistic discipline' (Williams 2000). In doing so, he argues against those who would align it more closely with the sciences, either in style, or in methodology, or in the pretence to a certain kind of intellectual authority, one that is thought to derive from a particular kind of objectivity, viz. a description of 'reality' that is minimally dependent on our perspective upon it. The contrast between the objectivity to which the (natural) sciences aspire and an appropriate ideal for philosophy is also defended by Charles Taylor (1985) in his discussion, already mentioned in the first part of this introduction, of the claim that human beings are self-interpreting animals: 'the claim is that our interpretation of ourselves and our experience is constitutive of what we are, and therefore cannot be considered as merely a view on reality, separable from reality, nor as an epiphenomenon, which can be by-passed in our understanding of reality' (Taylor 1985: 47). Williams likewise contends that the attempt to understand ourselves – the reality that is human experience – must be conducted from within our perspective on ourselves, rather than being governed by a conception of knowledge under the ideal of scientific objectivity, and is none the worse for that.

Williams goes on to argue (in Williams 2000, 2002) for the importance of history and a historical form of understanding for philosophy. He defends the view that philosophy is 'part of a more general attempt to make the best sense of our life, and so of our intellectual activities, in the situation in which we find ourselves' (Williams 2000: 479). He concludes his piece by reflecting on how philosophy is taught, and remarks that 'if we believe that philosophy might play an important part in making people think about what they are doing, then philosophy should acknowledge its connections with other ways of understanding ourselves' (Williams 2000: 495–6). While he chooses to focus on connections with history, we may readily see a place for psychoanalysis in this conception of philosophy and its place in the project of humanistic enquiry. In this connection, we may note a distinction Wollheim makes between 'pure' and 'applied' philosophy, a difference reflected in methodology, aim, and subject matter (Wollheim 1999: xi). Pure philosophy uses only conceptual analysis, aims at conceptual necessity, and discusses 'things as they must be anywhere'; applied philosophy 'employs conceptual analysis and whatever else can serve its needs', aims at

theoretical necessity (the laws of nature), and discusses features of this world. Most of what is involved in understanding ourselves requires applied philosophy, and what can 'serve its needs' in philosophical enquiry may differ from one question or approach to another. Psychoanalysis is as legitimate a source as history, and will yield a complementary philosophical perspective.

In this third form of relation between the two disciplines, there are deeper connections than those provided by the particular clinical data, theoretical concept, or issue. The two disciplines are united, with others, in a common aim, that of self-understanding, in the light of the inevitability (if Williams and Taylor are right) of self-interpretation. The nature of self-understanding, in either the singular or plural first-person, is itself a topic for discussion and debate in both disciplines, and it is noteworthy that elements of these debates parallel each other. Louise Braddock's earlier remarks on truth and truthfulness fit here. On Taylor's (1985) picture, truth about ourselves is only possible as a consequence of truthfulness; in the context of understanding one's emotions, he remarks that 'our articulations are open to challenge from our inarticulate sense of what is important, that is, we recognize that they ought to be faithful articulations of something of which we have as yet only fragmentary intimations' (Taylor 1985: 75). Braddock notes that for this self-interpretation to be successful, more than philosophy will be needed, and psychoanalysis may be seen as a complementary exercise towards the same end. As remarked above, psychoanalysis is not restricted to providing a means to personal self-understanding of this kind. Its construction of a general theory of the dynamics of the human mind can be taken up within other, broader enquiries into the nature of the human situation.

With this recognition of the shared goal of self-understanding comes a recognition of shared virtues, such as a fundamental commitment to truthfulness, to a form of courage in the face of mental pain of one variety or another, to refusing to foreclose the options in an awareness of the complexity of one's experience, subject, or question, and to a consequent humility about what and how much can be known, something noted in the earlier discussion of interdisciplinarity. Williams (2000: 495) remarks on his conception of philosophy, 'while it is certainly true that we all need to know more than we can hope to know . . . it makes a difference what it is that you know you do not know'.

In his paper, John Cottingham (Chapter 5) takes a further step beyond this (merely) collaborative project. He argues that not only has philosophy no need to reject psychoanalysis, and not only do the two disciplines converge, together with the religious quest, on attempts at self-understanding, but that philosophy – at least in the guise of moral philosophy, and I would add, philosophy of mind, due to the former's dependence on the latter in this particular regard – 'can hardly subsist' without psychoanalysis. For moral

philosophy must address the question of the gap between 'our ordinary human capacities' and 'what we might best achieve', and this is both something on which psychoanalysis has a great deal to say, and something it seeks to ameliorate. Hence, Cottingham argues, we cannot attain moral insight without psychoanalytic insight. There will be those who, happy to grant that moral insight is dependent on self-knowledge, may wish to contend that self-knowledge is not dependent on psychoanalysis or its concepts. That is not a debate I wish to comment on here, except to note again Michael Brearley's defence of the way in which psychoanalytic insight is continuous with 'everyday' insight (Chapter 1), and so if the letter of Cottingham's point raises eyebrows, the spirit of it should not. Moral philosophy, however, is but one area of philosophy, one aspect of self-understanding, even in the very broad form in which Cottingham understands it (the question of the good life, all told). The reach of psychoanalysis into philosophy in other fields is less likely to be as great, though, as discussed in the previous section, we should not overlook the extent to which particular topics of philosophical interest may be helpfully informed and developed by the deployment of psychoanalytic concepts.

Conclusion

I have argued that philosophy may take up psychoanalysis in three ways: first, in its attempts to make sense of human experience, it may take up the clinical data that psychoanalysis provides; second, it may take up psychoanalytic concepts and the theoretical mental processes and structures to which they refer, and this may occur to a greater or lesser extent, from the solution to a particular philosophical puzzle to a general theory of mind or framework of enquiry; and third, it may understand and relate to psychoanalysis as a sister discipline, governed by the same end of self-understanding through self-interpretation and similar virtues of truthfulness and openness, its enquiry a necessary complementary perspective on being human.

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